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heirs of the third opponent"1 were still the owners of the con-
tract, the parties, like the puppy mentioned above, were right
back where they had started from. Third opponent had appeared
in the case solely because of the proposed sheriff's sale and as
the sale had been annulled, there was nothing left in the case
upon which a judgment for the third opponent could be based.
VII. EVIDENCE
Robert A. Pascal*
Opinion Evidence
The admissibility of opinion evidence on matters of sanity
and competency is now generally recognized, as long as such
opinions are conclusions based on observed data and not merely
expressions of belief without foundation in the experience of
the witness.' The extent to which the background data, or "facts
on which the opinion is based," must be made known varies from
court to court.2 In Interdiction of Escats the supreme court de-
clared error the admission of opinions of a psychiatrist and a lay-
man as to the capacity of the defendant to manage her affairs on
the ground that "Neither of these witnesses, as a predicate for
his opinion, has stated any facts or circumstances upon which it
is based and from which the court is able to form and decree its
own conclusions."4
It is no doubt wise for a court to ascertain that the experi-
ence of an expert or lay witness qualifies him to render the opin-
ion offered in evidence; but to require a statement of the facts
on which the opinion is based so that the court may form its own
opinion is another matter. This, in effect, is to pit the opinion of
the witness against that of the court and in so doing to overlook
the reason for accepting opinion evidence. An opinion is ad-
mitted, if at all, because in the particular instance the witness
is better able than the court to evaluate the data correctly.5 The
expert witness' special training or experience renders him more
qualified than the court to interpret facts perhaps equally avail-
able to both. A layman's opinion may be more valuable than
111. The third opponent died during the pendency of the suit, but it is
small wonder-this type of litigation would worry anyone to death!
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Wigmore. A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in
Trials at Common Law (3 ed. 1940) H 1933-1938.
2. Id. at § 1938.
3. 206 La. 207, 19 So. (2d) 96 (1944).
4. 206 La. 207, 212; 19 So. (2d) 96.
5. Cf. Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, at §§ 1917(8)-1924.
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the court's if the observations on which his opinion is based are
peculiarly within his experience and cannot be transmitted com-
pletely or accurately to the court. In fact, when the principal
qualification of a witness to render an opinion is his technical
background or training or his long acquaintance with the person
or situation in question, the witness is actually incapable of re-
membering all factors affecting his judgment. Even if he tries
to remember them, he is unlikely to succeed in conveying to the
court the impression they made on him. Facts convincing to the
witness and which would have been convincing to judge or jury
had they observed them are lost or rendered unconvincing in the
process of intermediate communication. The court should not,
therefore, attempt to reach its own conclusions on the second-
hand facts. It should accept an opinion if it can be ascertained
that the witness has been in a position to observe the facts, has
actually observed them, and is capable of forming thereon a rele-
vant conclusion. In the case under consideration the psychiatrist
had treated the defendant for at least six weeks prior to her
transfer to a sanitarium and after her return therefrom. The lay
witness apparently had known the defendant for about fifteen
years. Their qualifications could have been considered sufficient
for the admission of their opinions.
Confessions
In State v. Ellis the supreme court correctly held error the
admission of a written confession alleged to be voluntary, but
which showed on its face that an inducement for confession had
been offered by the interrogating officer.8
VIII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
A. CRIMINAL LAW
Only three of the numerous criminal cases which were ap-
pealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court during the 1944-1945
judicial terms involved questions as to the interpretation and
6. Id. at § 1924.
7. 207 La. 812, 22 So. (2d) 181 (1945).
8. Art. 451, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928: "Before what purposes to be
a confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown
that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear,
duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises."
In view of the very definite statement of the above article, it is some-
what discouraging to note that the court cited decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and some of its own on the same point. One of the alleged
advantages of codified law is economy of effort.
0 Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
[Vol. vi
